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Bayesian analysis and free market trade
within the Roman Empire
Xavier Rubio-Campillo1,2,∗, María Coto-Sarmiento2,
Jordi Pérez-Gonzalez3 & José Remesal Rodríguez3
The trade networks of the Roman Empire are among the most intensively researched large-scale
market systems in antiquity, yet there is no consensus on the economic structure behind this vast
network. The difficulty arises from data fragmentation and the lack of formal analytical methods.
Here, the authors present a Bayesian analysis quantifying the extent to which four previously
proposed hypotheses match the evidence for the market system in Roman olive oil. Results suggest
that the size of economic agents involved in this network followed a power-law distribution,
strongly indicating the presence of free market structures supplying olive oil to Rome. This new
analysis offers an important tool to researchers exploring the impact of trade on the dynamics of
past societies.
Keywords: Roman Empire, Bayesian analysis, olive oil, trade, model selection
Introduction
Trade is one of the most important social interactions in human societies. Intuition
suggests that we should find evidence of common patterns in trade activities at different
periods and in different territories. Trade activities also show, however, a large degree of
diversity that needs to be considered. This diversity is particularly relevant when examining
past economies distinct from our own (Oka & Kusimba 2008). Contrasting dynamics
generate many research questions: how did trade networks change over time? What role did
communication play? What factors promoted the collapse or emergence of trade routes?
These challenges are even more relevant for long-range trade requiring complex
organisation. The Mediterranean is one of the most heavily studied areas to have developed
intensive long-range trade. Benign climatic conditions encouraged maritime mobility, and,
as a consequence, cultural exchange flourished between regions thousands of kilometres
apart (Bevan 2014). This feedback loop between economic and political processes reached
its peak during the Roman Empire (first to third centuries AD). Despite the abundance
of archaeological data for this activity, some of the dynamics behind this interconnected
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economy are still subject to debate (e.g. Carreras & Soto 2013; Brughmans & Poblome
2016; Orengo & Livarda 2016).
The archaeological record provides a wealth of evidence, such as the vast quantities of
amphorae used to ship liquid products. Assumptions regarding the use of these containers
have, however, been recently challenged. Such assumptions include the lack of re-use, or the
unambiguous association between amphora types and their contents (Romanus et al. 2009;
Foley et al. 2012; Pecci et al. 2017). In addition, proposed patterns of increase or decrease
in trade activities based on the frequency distribution of amphorae could also be explained
by the use of containers that rarely survive in the archaeological record, such as barrels and
skins (Wilson 2009).
All of these uncertainties affect the field of Roman economy studies (Bowman &Wilson
2009). Rome was one of the largest economies of the past, but was the Roman world really
interconnected? What role did the state play? Did political unification promote economic
growth? The lack of clear archaeological proxies for the structure of Roman markets sparked
a long and heated debate between the initial modernist, almost-capitalistic perspective,
and the opposed primitivists. A number of works have recently recognised the diversity
of dynamics within Roman trade (e.g. Finley 1999; Scheidel et al. 2007; Scheidel 2012).
These recent works highlight the need to apply quantitative methods to study the spectrum
of market structures (Bowman & Wilson 2009; Scheidel 2014). This is not an easy task:
working hypotheses often overlap and most of them probably explain only a small part
of the entire picture. It is also not clear what type of archaeological proxy is required to
evaluate the hypotheses, due to the data uncertainty already mentioned. Ultimately, it seems
unrealistic to assume that a traditional statistical framework would be able, from existing
evidence, to reject competing hypotheses.
It is important to note that these challenges are not restricted to Roman studies, nor
to study of the past. There is a growing debate concerning the need to develop research
frameworks able to quantify the plausibility of different hypotheses addressing existing data
(Johnson & Omland 2004; Towner & Luttbeg 2007; Crema et al. 2014; Kandler & Powell
2015; Buck & Meson 2015; Rubio-Campillo 2016).
Bayesian inference is a statistical framework particularly well suited to confront this
challenge by model selection. It is founded on the premise that knowledge of a given
system with its associated uncertainty can gradually be updated through new evidence.
First, competing hypotheses are transformed into a set of statistical models and parameters.
The possible values for each parameter receive an initial probability (i.e. a prior), following
a specific statistical distribution based on existing knowledge. A likelihood function is
used to derive the probabilities of any given result by assessing the value of the input
parameters. The updated knowledge (i.e. the posterior distribution) is then computed to infer
a) the probability that a given model generated the existing evidence; and b) the relative
explanatory power of a set of competing models.
The framework of model selection that we have developed is designed to quantify the
extent to which different market structures match the evidence for long-range trade within
the Roman Empire. The approach has been applied to a dataset of thousands of codes
stamped in amphora handles collected from Monte Testaccio in Rome. This evidence was
used to infer the market structure of the massive olive-oil trade system that supplied the
© Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2017
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Bayesian analysis and free market trade within the Roman Empire
capital from the production area of the Guadalquivir River, located in the Hispania Baetica
province. Bayesian inference has then been applied to evaluate four previously suggested
models by examining their explanatory power in relation to the dataset.
Archaeological proxies of market structures
Monte Testaccio is a 45m-high artificial mound in Rome located near to the east bank of
the Tiber. It was created through the deposition of thousands of amphorae following their
Figure 1. Dressel 20 amphora with a stamp, PNN, in one
of its sides (after Aguilera Martín 2012).
shipment to the city via river transport.
Most of the excavated materials are iden-
tified as Dressel 20 amphorae, similar to
those depicted in Figure 1. This amphora
type is typically associated with Baetican
olive oil, which was widely distributed
from southern Spain throughout the
western Empire from the first to the third
centuries AD (Remesal Rodríguez 1998).
A large percentage of Dressel 20
amphorae displayed a stamp identifying an
economic agent linked to the container
(see Figure 2 for an example of the
most frequently found code from Monte
Testaccio). It has been suggested that
the stamped code identifies the owner of
the land where the olives were harvested
and the oil was produced (Garlan 1983;
Remesal Rodríguez 2013). Other authors
suggest that the stamp refers to the
workshop that made the amphorae (Funari
1996; Berni Millet 2008). Whichever is
the case, the actors identified in the stamps were part of a common economic activity linked
to long-range trade.
The number of stamps displaying the same code was chosen as the archaeological proxy
of the actor’s weight within the market. This proxy is relative, as it does not define the
absolute production of each actor. A code displayed in 100 stamps will, however, naturally
identify an individual with higher economic weight than another represented by a code
found in 5 stamps. The aggregated frequency distribution of the codes is used as the proxy
for the entire market structure (i.e. the number of agents displaying the same frequency
value).
Our analysis used a dataset of 7520 stamps collected from 10 different excavations at
Monte Testaccio, from 1990–2014 (Blázquez et al. 1994; Blázquez & Remesal Rodríguez
1999, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014). The chronological span of these remains covers 117
years (from AD 143–260). A quarter of these stamps were incomplete due to fragmentation
or erosion, and a probabilistic model was created to integrate this uncertainty into the
© Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2017
1243
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.15184/aqy.2017.131
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Edinburgh, on 21 Sep 2017 at 08:40:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Xavier Rubio-Campillo et al.
Figure 2. Photograph and digitised version of a stamp
where PNN can be read. It is the most common code found
in the dataset, and its three letters probably identify the
initials of a full Roman name or tria nomina.
analysis by assigning complete codes to
incomplete stamps. The method then
used Monte Carlo simulation to generate
a dataset ready to be analysed (the
complete process is described in the online
supplementary material (OSM), section 1).
Figure 3 shows the frequency distribu-
tion of the codes found in the amphora
dataset. It can be observed that the shape
is dominated by a heavy tail, but further
analysis is required to assess the validity of
each competing hypothesis.
Model selection framework
Four market structures were evaluated
against this archaeological proxy. The com-
peting models were chosen from previously
published studies that could be linked to
olive-oil trade within the Roman Empire.
H1: balanced model
Demand is fulfilled by the aggregation of small-scale production units (Poblome et al.
2013). This would translate into several agents of similar capacity.
H2: balanced model with large actors
Political connections alter the previous dynamic by creating large-scale producers linked to
the state (e.g. Erdkamp 2005: 109, for grain trade).
H3: concentration dynamics
Farming activities are often characterised by a minimum threshold, below which production
is not sustainable. As a consequence, small agents are absorbed by larger agents and land
ownership is gradually concentrated (Allanson 1992).
H4: Pareto principle
A self-organised and interconnected economic system follows the Pareto principle: 80 per
cent of the market is controlled by 20 per cent of its agents (Axtell 2001). This structure
would generate a small number of large-scale producers complemented by a large number
of small-scale producers.
The focus on the code frequency distributions allowed us to translate the hypotheses
above into statistical models (as summarised in Table 1). This approach captured the
properties of each suggested structure while accepting a certain degree of stochasticity:
© Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2017
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Bayesian analysis and free market trade within the Roman Empire
Figure 3. Empirical frequency distribution of codes in stamps. The plot shows the number of codes (y-axis) appearing in a
given number of stamps (x-axis). The red dot depicts the code PNN, which has the largest number of repetitions (253). Both
axes are transformed to logarithmic scale.
Table 1. Each hypothesis has been translated into a statistical model based on
expected frequency distributions.
Model Description Distribution
M1 balanced Poisson
M2 balanced with large actors negative binomial
M3 concentration log-normal
M4 power-law Pareto
 M1 transformed H1 into a Poisson distribution where parameter λ defines the
average size for the entire set of producers.
 M2 used a negative binomial distribution to generate a heavy tail composed of a
few large-scale producers, according to H2.
 M3 represented the concentration process of H3 as a log-normal distribution.
The shape of this model is able to represent: a) a lack of small producers; b)
the predominance of mid-sized producers; and c) a heavy tail of large-scale
producers.
© Antiquity Publications Ltd, 2017
1245
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.15184/aqy.2017.131
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Edinburgh, on 21 Sep 2017 at 08:40:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Xavier Rubio-Campillo et al.
Table 2. Parameters for the four examined models.
Model Parameter Name Prior
M1 λ mean U(1,30)
M2 r number of successful trials U(1,100)
p probability of success U(0,1)
M3 μ mean U(0.1,4)
σ standard deviation U(0.1,3)
M4 α shape U(0.1,10)
Xm scale 1
 M4 implementedH4 as a Pareto distribution, displaying a large number of small
producers complemented by a small number of large producers.
The analytical framework chosen for model selection was based on Bayesian inference.
The translation of the hypotheses into statistical models allowed us to compute the posterior
distributions easily using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Uninformed prior beliefs
were chosen for all the models, as summarised in Table 2. The OSM, section 2, lists the
parameters used in the MCMC execution. The entire framework was implemented using
R, Jags and R2Jags (Plummer 2003; Su & Yajima 2015; R Core Team 2016).
The final step of the method was to quantify the plausibility of the four competing
models, taking into account a) the goodness of fit to the evidence; and b) their degree of
parsimony. The Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) was chosen for this task, as it is
an intuitive information-based measure equivalent to popular indices, such as the Akaike
Information Criterion (Spiegelhalter et al. 2002, 2014). Despite some limitations, DIC
is a method commonly used in Bayesian inference when the posterior distributions are
approximately multivariate-normal. This measure allows the researcher to take into account
both the complexity and the deviance from the model’s outcome to existing evidence,
thereby quantifying parsimony and goodness of fit within a Bayesian framework.
Results
All posterior distributions follow unimodal shapes, thus suggesting that the signal in the
dataset is strong enough to overcome noise and generate consistent results (as can be
seen in the OSM, section 3). The goodness of fit of the models can first be explored
by comparing the evidence against simulated data obtained from each model. Figure 4
shows the results generated by each model using the mean of each posterior distribution
as parameter values. The two balanced models (M1 andM2) generate patterns substantially
different from the observations. ModelsM3 andM4 are closer to the frequency distribution
of the collected stamps. The fitness of M3 and M4 suggests the presence of some producers
of significantly larger size than the average value of the sample. This could have resulted
from a concentration process generated by the market. The huge demand for olive oil
generated by the city of Rome must surely have put a lot of pressure on the production
of this commodity. Consequently, Baetican producers could have generated economies of
scale in order to maximise the efficiency of the existing infrastructures.
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Figure 4. Comparison between evidence and models. Grey dots display the frequency distributions of codes in stamps, while coloured points show random deviates generated with the
mean values obtained from the posterior distributions.
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Table 3. DIC measurements for each model. The following measures are
provided: a) goodness of fit; b) complexity penalty; c) penalised deviance; and
d) distance to best candidate (i.e.M4). Better models have lower values, and
differences beyond 100 are typically defined as significant.
Model Mean Deviance Penalty Penalised deviance DIC
M1 18392 1.044 18394 13333
M2 8529 1.038 8530 3649
M3 7206 2.06 7208 2147
M4 5060 1.043 5061 0
DIC values for the four models are summarised in Table 3. Comparison of these measures
suggests that the best fit for this sample is a power-law distribution, in which most olive-
oil producers identified by stamps were very small, while concentration processes created a
significant quantity of middle-sized agents and a very small number of large-scale producers.
Even though it is not usually possible to identify these large actors, they were probably
linked to the Roman political system (i.e. members of the Senate or the imperial family).
Discussion
The identification of a power-law distribution requires consideration of the mechanism
causing this distinct signal in the evidence (Stumpf & Porter 2012). This statistical
distribution has received considerable attention since its creation, owing to its unique
properties. One of the most distinctive characteristics is that power-laws exhibit scale
invariance (i.e. the features of the distribution remain constant over the entire range). If
both axes of the power-law are transformed to a logarithmic scale, the sample will follow a
straight line (this can be observed in Figure 4).
Power-laws have been identified in disciplines as varied as physics, ecology, sociology and
linguistics (Clauset et al. 2009). Their transdisciplinary relevance is explained by the fact
that power-laws are proxies for self-organised optimal systems with some degree of hierarchy
(Newman 2005). It would be very difficult to generate a power-law by external causes on
account of scale invariance, but a power-law emerges when evolutionary dynamics enforce
optimality by selection.
Free markets are complex systems fulfilling both self-organisation and optimality, and
could therefore be the underlying process generating the shape of our dataset. This
prediction has been proved elsewhere in contemporary case studies (Axtell 2001). Although
we cannot disregard the possibility that the pattern detected here was generated by a
different structure, the simplest interpretation for our results is that the Roman olive-oil
trade was organised as a free market. This is the outcome that would be expected by
researchers who have documented the existence of private enterprise (e.g. Temin 2001,
2013). It is difficult to conceive how a state-organised market could generate a power-law.
It would require a structure with thousands of small-sized producers complemented by a few
large-sized agents. The creation of this organisation, if at all possible, would have required
the investment of a large amount of resources and fine control over the system. Finally, the
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nature of the dataset also supports the existence of a densely interconnected free market, as
the amphora stamps that follow the power-law were made 2000km from Rome.
The work presented here has its limitations, as does any other model. Our analysis, for
example, cannot confirm whether the stamps identify olive-oil producers or pottery makers.
The first option seems more plausible, as it could generate the economies of scale needed
to produce a power-law; it is feasible that an olive-oil producer owned an area much larger
than the competitors, while a pottery workshop could not be hundreds of times bigger than
its competitors due to physical constraints. Neither hypothesis can, however, be discarded,
unless new data are discovered. This uncertainty does not invalidate our results, as the
analysis indicates long-range trade activity exhibiting free market properties independently
of the agents identified by the stamps (olive-oil producers or amphora producers).
Power-law distributions are ubiquitous to datasets deriving from contemporary activities,
but they are less commonly observed in archaeological datasets (Bentley &Maschner 2003;
Bentley & Shennan 2003; Grove 2011; Haas et al. 2015). Several studies show how their
dataset’s shape follows a power-law only in the heavy tail, while the left segment does not
match the log-log straight line. These partial fits could, however, also be explained by log-
normal distributions, as in our model M3 (for discussion within archaeology, see Bentley
2003; beyond archaeology, see Allen et al. 2001; Eeckhout 2004; Levy 2009). This distinc-
tion is important, as the two shapes are generated by critically different social phenomena.
Log-normal distributions are essentially produced by additive processes, while power-laws
emerge from complex self-organised systems and indicate a higher degree of inequality and
interaction amongst their components. Additionally, log-normal distributions display an
arithmetic mean value (i.e. there is an average size of producers), while power-laws do not.
The analysis presented here has revealed one of the first examples of an archaeological
dataset that follows a complete power-law distribution. There are probably very few
contexts that meet the conditions required for the development of a large-scale integrated
market. The subset of these scenarios, where the structure of the market can be found
in the archaeological record, is even lower, due to a diversity of taphonomic processes
(i.e. survivorship bias). We have identified a power-law distribution within an economy
quite different from contemporary systems, thus suggesting that the same pattern could be
identified in other case studies. Additional research is needed to understand whether this
power-law is an isolated scenario specific to the Roman Empire, or a general pattern within
the trade networks of past societies.
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